world, the city's relative importance has declined because the entire country has opened up. While Hong Kong has largely kept its distinct legal, political, and social systems, the political and economic influence of the Mainland on the city has grown enormously after 1997. 2 How can Hong Kong, as a special administrative region (SAR) located on the southern periphery of China, influence politics and governance in the Mainland?
3 Given the difficulties of measuring such influence, absent extensive longitudinal research and surveys of key officials and stakeholders, this paper aims to develop a framework that delineates the various corridors for Hong Kong's influence on politics and governance in China (see Table 1 ).
Social and political interactions are mutual. Hong Kong is increasingly influenced by deepening socioeconomic integration with the Mainland and Chinese national policies. As an SAR, Hong Kong cannot easily influence high politics in China. Indeed, only in July 2003, when half a million Hong Kong people, around 7% of the total population, protested against planned national security legislation and the poor performance of the HKSAR government was Beijing compelled to accommodate their demands and edge out unpopular Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in early 2005.
However, as Sonny Lo has rightly argued, given Hong Kong's small size and economic dependence on the Mainland, the SAR's political influence, reflected in constitutional, participatory, institutional, and cultural dimensions, is in fact "disproportionate to its tiny location on the map of China." 4 While agreeing with Lo's overall orientation, this paper proposes a more elaborate scheme (see Table 1 ). Hong Kong's impact on politics and governance in China is dynamic, not static. Such influence changes over time and varies across sectors and locations. For instance, neighboring areas such as Guangdong Province and particularly the metropolis of Shenzhen are more likely than elsewhere to be affected by Hong Kong's sociocultural influence and its spillover effect on law and politics. 5 Similarly, Mainland officials working in the SAR or managing cross-boundary issues are best positioned to appreciate Hong Kong's rule-based, transparent, and professional public service. Some Mainlanders think that Hong Kong's pluralistic society leads to indecision and policy impasses, while others admire its political pluralism, especially if they can live in the SAR for an extended period of time. This paper does not argue that Hong Kong has exerted enormous influence on Mainland politics, but even the basic evidence gathered here illustrates its substantial and continuing influence across different dimensions.
C o n s t I t u t I o n a l d I m e n s I o n s
Hong Kong's exercise of a high degree of autonomy under OCTS constitutes the most important evidence of its political influence on China's constitutional order. Wu Guoguang suggests that the OCTS policy "was a constitutional way to preserve Hong Kong's institutional advantages while China took over international legal or Westphalian sovereignty of the island." Wu argues that Hong Kong has enjoyed "institutional" or "soft" sovereignty within a sovereign China: the political institutions established during British colonialism have largely been preserved. 6 At the day-to-day level, Hong Kong's "informative" or "communicative" role, exercised through its social, cultural, and political influence, is changing Chinese political culture as information and values from the city permeate the Mainland. 7 At the political level, the demands for a faster pace of democracy in Hong Kong have made the city appealing to China's pro-democracy activists, while at the same time Hong Kong's current quasi-democratic system is attractive to Mainland officials and intellectuals who prefer a gradual approach.
The entrenchment of OCTS suggests important possibilities for China's future constitutional order. There are contending views on whether Hong Kong's constitutional status facilitates the development of federalism in China. For instance, some see Hong Kong as "an experiment in Chinese federalism" because substantial autonomy, notably, in economic and financial areas, has been delegated to the SAR. The future territorial division of power in China may not fully fit any prevailing models such as federalism, even though some scholars argue that China already demonstrates de facto federalism. 11 Different trajectories are entirely possible. Should Beijing fulfill its promise of a more democratic polity for Hong Kong and sustain its autonomy into the longer future, the "federalist" elements of OCTS could assist the emergence of a more democratic China by accommodating institutional and ideological pluralism. However, Hong Kong's autonomy must not harm Beijing's core interests such as national unity and stability to achieve this end-goal.
P o l I t I Ca l d I m e n s I o n s
To explore Hong Kong's political influence on the Mainland, it is best to begin by examining the city's active role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, which profoundly affected the Beijing-Hong Kong relationship. Many residents continue to see Hong Kong as a base from which to democratize the authoritarian regime in the Mainland. Similarly, Beijing regards Hong Kong as a subversive base. First, the scale and impact of Hong Kong's political organization and mobilization in 1989 showed that if Hong Kong people have the will to shape politics in the Mainland, such impact can be substantial and its potential cannot be underestimated. In the early summer of that year, waves of protest were organized by Hong Kong people to support the students protesting in the Mainland and exert pressure on the Chinese leadership. On May 21, an estimated 600,000 to one million people in Hong Kong protested against the imposition of martial law in Beijing. Hong Kong delegates to the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) urged their respective bodies' Standing Committees to convene a meeting on the pro-democracy movement. On May 28, an estimated 1.5 million people protested in Hong Kong. Celebrities in the show business community organized a concert in late May and successfully raised about US$1.5 million for the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (the Alliance).
12 On June 4, some 200,000 people joined a sit-in, and on June 5, 14 Second, the annual June 4 candlelight vigil organized by the Alliance, which remains the world's largest commemoration of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, continues to insert the incident into the political discourse of Greater China. 15 Although the number of people attending has dropped since 1989, the vigils commemorating the 20th and 21st anniversaries of the incident in 2009 and 2010 each attracted 150,000, as claimed by the organizers (or 62,800 and 113,000, respectively, as estimated by the police). 16 An increasing number of Mainlanders visiting Hong Kong joined such activities, although their number is hard to estimate.
17 Some retired cadres, students, and tourists from the Mainland consider Hong Kong, with its freedoms and degree of democracy, a source of political hope for China. 18 Many leaders of the Democratic Party (DP) and other pan-democratic politicians in Hong Kong serve as key leaders and supporters of the Alliance. The pan-democratic parties such as the DP and the Civic Party support democracy in China in their manifestos. They regularly introduce motions in Hong Kong's legislature demanding the rehabilitation of the June 4 Incident, although such motions, without legislative effect, have been negated ever since 1997. 20 Liu Xiaobo, a leading dissident awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, has published books and articles in Hong Kong demanding democracy and human rights in China. 21 On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Charter 08, a manifesto calling for improving China's human rights, was drafted by Liu and other dissidents and signed by 300 Chinese intellectuals and citizens, including 61 Hong Kong activists and legislators. 22 Liu was sentenced to prison in December 2009 for 11 years for "inciting subversion to state power"; numerous civil society and political groups in Hong Kong and elsewhere have repeatedly called for his release. 23 The Falun Gong quasireligious social movement, which is banned in the Mainland, operates openly in Hong Kong.
Fourth, civil society groups and professional bodies in Hong Kong have openly campaigned for freedom and human rights or supported the development of the non-government sector in the Mainland. Hong Kong's prodemocracy politicians, legal scholars, and lawyers have set up a China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG) to champion the protection of China's human rights lawyers and other legal rights defenders. 24 The CHRLCG connects with Mainland lawyers and acts as a bridge between the lawyers and the outside world. In 2009, after the Mainland authorities refused to renew the licenses of human rights lawyers, the CHRLCG wrote to law societies in the U.K. and U.S. seeking their support. In 2010, the group supported Mainland human rights lawyers involved in the trials of Liu Xiaobo and also of Tan Zuoren, who openly criticized the corruption involved in substandard school construction. Thousands of students reportedly died as shoddy schools collapsed during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. 25 Similarly, the Support Group for Prisoners of Conscience in China (SGPCC) was formed in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Journalists Association has long been a watchdog over freedom of speech in the Mainland. In 2010, the association and other organizations jointly signed a statement condemning the sentences of Liu Xiaobo and Tan Zuoren. The groups requested that the Chinese government comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which China is a signatory, and release dissidents. 26 The Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy (ICHRD) provides information about human rights abuses in the Mainland, while the SGPCC collects data about prisoners of conscience. Although not strictly political by nature, Hong Kong's non-government organizations (NGOs) have operated in the Mainland and promoted civil society and the rights of the underprivileged. For instance, one-third of Oxfam Hong Kong's total program expenses are devoted to poverty alleviation in the Mainland; the organization has programs in Beijing and Guangdong as well as in less developed areas. 27 While their work includes emergency relief, work on AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), and basic education, they also cover advocacy and NGO development, which has aroused attention from the Party-state. In fact in February 2010, the Party core group of the Ministry of Education warned Chinese universities to boycott Oxfam Hong Kong's volunteer training because they referred undergraduates to internships in groups that defend rights. A rally supporting the use of the Cantonese language in Guangzhou held on two Sundays in July and August 2010 revealed the demonstration effect of Hong Kong's civil society protests. In preparing for the Asian Games, the call by a CPPCC delegate for replacing Cantonese with the national language, Putonghua (i.e., Mandarin Chinese) on major TV channels in Guangzhou triggered protests to defend the use of Cantonese, both in Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Parallel to the rise of a new generation of young political activists in Hong Kong, hundreds of demonstrators in these demonstrations defending the use of Cantonese in Guangzhou comprised mainly of the younger generation have borrowed political slogans and symbols from the former colony. As Lang Zi, a poet, editor, and blogger in Guangzhou acknowledged, people in Guangdong were "inspired by what Hong Kong people did to save their valuable past."
30 Some Hong Kong citizens even joined the protest in Guangzhou, while activists from the provincial capital have visited Hong Kong to learn the skills of political organization.
There are narrow official channels for Hong Kong people to participate in Mainland affairs, mainly through their representatives at the NPC and CPPCC. There are no systematic studies on the impact of these Hong Kong deputies on Mainland politics, but their role is generally considered to be quite limited. 31 They can receive complaints from citizens or raise issues during meetings, but their appointments reflect recognition of their status in the 
I d e at I o n a l d I m e n s I o n s
The impact of the Hong Kong media on the Mainland is important, but very difficult to assess. Freedom of the press and of expression in Hong Kong not only informs the Chinese who have access to diverse views and information about China (e.g., those who study and work in Hong Kong) but also engenders a demonstration effect on the Mainland media. Many Hong Kong newspapers and TV channels carry extensive and critical coverage of the Mainland. There are many restrictions that limit the reporting of Hong Kong's journalists, but their professionalism and persistence have put them in the forefront in reporting Mainland affairs. As China opens up, Hong Kong's free and vibrant media will continue to provide an alternative model of media for the Mainland.
In 2001, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) authorized Hong Kong-based Phoenix Satellite Television (PSTV) to broadcast its Chinese Channel into the nearby Pearl River Delta (PRD) region of southern China. This was the first time that an outside broadcaster was permitted to broadcast into the Mainland. Before this, Mainlanders within range ignored the official ban on satellite dishes and gained access to PSTV and other overseas channels. While PSTV adopts a pro-Chinese government editorial line, its news and commentaries include extensive coverage of events in Hong Kong and Taiwan (and elsewhere) unavailable in the Mainland. Hong Kong's other free television programs must be broadcast through the cable network in Guangdong, and are subject to official censorship. 42 Whether such exposure will influence their political values and behavior needs to be further studied, but Hong Kong clearly provides an increasing number of Chinese easy access to a variety of information and views.
I n t e r g ov e r n m e n ta l d I m e n s I o n s the administrative and Policy arena: Knowledge transfer and Capacity Building
Given its reputation for efficiency and international benchmarking, Hong Kong's public service has long been regarded as a model of good governance for the Mainland to emulate. A comparison of the World Bank's governance indicators shows that Hong Kong is far ahead of the Mainland and other East Asian countries, and compares favorably with Japan and the U.S. (see Table 2 ). Hong Kong's influence on the Mainland in promoting good governance flows through both knowledge transfer and capacity building. Focal points include the appointment of Hong Kong advisers, the training of Chinese civil servants, and lessons to learn from Hong Kong's experience in anti-corruption and public management. Many senior civil servants and professionals from 39 Various practices in Hong Kong have already been adopted to reduce regulatory loopholes for corruption. For instance, in May 2004, drawing from Hong Kong's practice, Shenzhen decided that all infrastructural projects would be managed by the Bureau of Public Works, in order to achieve effective monitoring. 58 Exchanges between Hong Kong and the Mainland over integrity management have been frequent, and the number of Chinese officials briefed annually by the ICAC rose steadily from 3,000 in 1997 to 5,000 in 2009. 59 Both central and local officials for years have called for learning from Hong Kong's anti-corruption experience. Nonetheless, owing to the differences in the two politico-legal systems and the multiplicity of Party-state organs involved in anti-corruption, Chinese authorities have not fully adopted the institutional design of the ICAC model. The Party's own discipline inspection system remains the most important anti-corruption entity.
the Institutional arena: extending hong Kong's Influence through Intergovernmental Cooperation
With the growing socioeconomic integration between Hong Kong and South China, many intergovernmental mechanisms have been created to manage emerging cross-boundary problems. Although such networks are not dominated by Hong Kong, the HKSAR government can use them as a platform to influence its Mainland counterparts. In particular, Hong Kong has received strong support from the central government, creating an incentive for Guangdong's leadership to team up with the SAR in seeking policy support from Beijing. The following section illustrates such efforts for national and regional planning, food safety, public health, and the environment.
Policy Advocacy in National and Regional Planning
With blossoming competition among China's regions, the HKSAR and Guangdong governments have found it useful to work as partners in seeking preferential treatment from the central government. Abandoning its pre-1997 suspicions about integration with the Mainland, the HKSAR government has been active in ensuring a role for Hong Kong in regional development. Since 2004, the government has actively participated in the 62 Specifically, the HKSAR government wants continued central support for Hong Kong's status as an international financial, commercial, and shipping center (especially through enlarging its RMB business). Officials also seek to expand Hong Kong's services in the Mainland under CEPA and to reaffirm Hong Kong's role as a key driver of financial development in the PRD. 63 Having central endorsement enables the HKSAR government to better deal with Mainland agencies over policy coordination and implementation. 65 Although a mechanism monitoring and quarantining vegetable supplies to Hong Kong had been operating since the 1980s, the monitoring of livestock, poultry, and freshwater fish has remained an issue in recent years. Concerns have been raised about the presence of streptococcus suis, a porcine pathogen. Scientists also worry about the use of the widely banned dye compound malachite green against oömycetes, microorganisms that can infect freshwater fish.
Such concerns prompted both sides to formulate an emergency response mechanism in October 2005. The AQSIQ and Hong Kong's Environmental and Hygiene Department later agreed on new quarantine procedures for chilled ducks and geese exported to Hong Kong. 66 Liaison agreements between the HKSAR and Guangdong for urgent high-level meetings in case of significant incidents were reached in April 2006. 67 In response to growing food safety problems, various inspection and quarantine measures for food and agricultural products were introduced in 2007-09. Such efforts by the HKSAR government in shaping Guangdong's governance of health and food safety had helped reduce the frequency of incidents. In fact, Guangdong's advisers urged the provincial government to adopt Hong Kong's management, registration, and monitoring system to ensure better food safety in the province.
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Ensuring Water Quality
Hong Kong has played a major role in enhancing the transparency in information about water quality because it has relied mainly upon water from Guangdong since the 1960s. The latest agreement contains provisions on the quality of Dongjiang (East River) water supplied to Hong Kong. Apart from building a dedicated aqueduct to link the intake at Dongjiang and the Shenzhen Reservoir in June 2003, the Guangdong water authority operates a monitoring and control system as well as a mechanism to exchange information with Hong Kong regularly. 69 These efforts have greatly enhanced the transparency of information relating to water quality and water management in the Mainland. Under the mechanism, Guangdong provides water quality monitoring data on a monthly basis. Data supplied to Hong Kong are delivered on a daily and weekly basis. Hong Kong publishes some of these data through the Internet, including some data provided by the Environmental Protection Department in Guangdong. 70 The availability of such information has helped the Hong Kong community to monitor Dongjiang water quality and Guangdong authorities to further improve it.
Improving Regional Air Quality
With rapid industrialization in the PRD since 1978, deteriorating air quality in the region became a serious public concern in Hong Kong. (RSP), and volatile organic compounds (VOC). 71 Although environmental groups criticized these efforts as insufficient, it was the first time Hong Kong got Guangdong to commit to specific targets and enhance the transparency of information disclosure. In December 2003, both sides formulated the PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan. 72 A PRD Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network with 16 monitoring stations was jointly established in mid-2005. Since late that year, an index of daily air quality information for various parts of the PRD region has been released online; a report is jointly submitted every half year. A set of standard operating procedures for monitoring has been jointly developed. These cooperative efforts have spurred greater objectivity in data collection and transparency of air quality information in Guangdong.
the Case of shenzhen
Shenzhen merits special treatment because it has been borrowing so systematically from Hong Kong that it may well become an extension of a quasiHong Kong development model. The latest impetus by Shenzhen stems from its economic transformation from a manufacturing base to a more diversified economy with a growing service sector. Because the land resources are almost all developed, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) looks to move up the value chain and seek closer economic integration with Hong Kong in order to build a modern service economy using the latter's management and regulatory expertise. Xu Zongheng, the former mayor of Shenzhen (2005-09), publicly argued that despite the differences between the two areas, Shenzhen should not only "serve Hong Kong" but also "learn from Hong Kong" in areas such as social management, urban construction, public service, government operation, and democracy and law (minzhu fazhi). 73 Although Xu was arrested for corruption in 2009, his successor has not deviated from his path. In 2010, Shenzhen's Party chief Wang Rong regarded Singapore, Hong Kong, and Seoul as the benchmarks for further development. 74 The following analysis focuses on Hong Kong's influence on Shenzhen's administrative and political reforms and the planning of Qianhai District.
Hong Kong as a Reference for Administrative Reform
In November 2001, the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform approved Shenzhen as a test site for deepening administrative reform; delegations were sent to study the administrative systems in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.K. in January 2002. 75 Shenzhen's reform proposal aimed to differentiate administrative powers into three areas: policy formulation, execution, and supervision (juece, zhixing, jiandu). Former Mayor Yu Youjun argued that decision-making bodies should focus on policy making but not implementation, executive agencies should mainly be doing policy implementation but not formulation, and supervisory and auditing bodies should jointly conduct supervision. 76 Huang Weiping, a professor at Shenzhen University and a major drafter of the blueprint, confirmed that the reform had drawn various lessons from Hong Kong. business, social welfare, and charity bodies no longer had to attach themselves to "supervisors" (yewu zhuquan danwei) after formal registration. 82 In order to build a "harmonious society," Shenzhen promoted the profession of social work and the outsourcing of social services through competitive bidding to service providers, copying from Hong Kong's experience. In 2008, Shenzhen's Civil Affairs Bureau introduced a major program so that its social workers would be trained and supervised by Hong Kong's non-profit professionals.
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Shenzhen's civil service reform also followed Hong Kong's experience by introducing non-civil service contracts in June 2000. 84 Starting from 2010, all civil servants would be employed on a contractual basis, renewable every three years. 85 Under Mayor Xu Qin, who has a doctorate in business administration from Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Shenzhen will send promising officials to Hong Kong for short-term training in subjects ranging from urban management to social development, in order to build a serviceoriented government. 86 
Engaging Hong Kong to Build the Qianhai District
After intense lobbying from Shenzhen, the State Council in August 2010 approved its plan to develop the Qianhai District into a demonstration zone for modern services by learning from Hong Kong. Various advisers proposed turning Qianhai into "a Special Zone within a Special Zone." 87 Shenzhen's Party Secretary Wang Rong maintained that Shenzhen would learn from mid-2010 completed a government-sponsored consultancy to explore Shenzhen's future trajectory. 92 One retired senior official with extensive knowledge of Hong Kong advocated various political reform measures for Guangdong, with Shenzhen serving as the test site. 93 He proposed the direct elections of officials at the town and county levels in the countryside and street and urban district levels in the cities; strengthening the power of the people's congresses, especially over public finance and government appointments; and allowing community and business organizations to nominate candidates for people's deputies.
Other proposals included allowing campaigning by candidates and reducing state intervention in economic and social affairs. It is no coincidence that the more-daring advocates of political reform have working experience in Hong Kong affairs. Besides scholars and officials, some business persons such as the founder of Vanke, Wang Shi, a leading Shenzhen-based real estate developer, have suggested that Shenzhen should learn from Hong Kong by promoting democratic elections, citizen rights, and civil society. 94 Although President Hu Jintao's speech commemorating Shenzhen's 30th anniversary in October 2010 did not designate Shenzhen as a "special political zone," Premier Wen Jiabao has reiterated that without the safeguard of political reform, the fruits of economic reform will be lost and the goal of modernization cannot be achieved. 95 Divergent views among China's top leaders and their overriding concern with stability have thwarted political experiments in Shenzhen. However, attempts to introduce political reform have never ceased there: should China expedite political reform again, Shenzhen may likely become a test site.
C o n C l u s I o n
As China globalizes, Hong Kong will no longer remain the sole model for reference. The political and economic influence of the Mainland in Hong Kong has also increased significantly since 2003. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's values, practices, and experiences have already been selectively incorporated in different sectors in the Mainland, most notably in South China. Constitutionally, Hong Kong's entrenchment of OCTS demonstrates the value of institutional diversity and suggests multiple possibilities for China's evolving constitutional order. Politically, aside from offering support to dissidents, lawyers defending human rights, or other pro-democracy forces in China, Hong Kong's pursuit of democracy will have major implications if China embarks upon political reform. 96 With the commitment for universal suffrage to elect the chief executive in 2017 and the LegCo in 2020, China has proposed a democratic road map for Hong Kong. Although the exact details for these elections are not finalized, the importance of this democratic experiment within the Chinese body politic should not be discounted. At the intergovernmental level, the Mainland authorities in South China have selectively utilized Hong Kong's experiences in improving their governance. With the growing integration between the two areas, Hong Kong's informal influence will expand even further. While being embraced by a rising China, Hong Kong has continued to play a unique role in influencing its governance and politics. 
